Lebanon’s Entrapment in a Dark Web of Crisis: A Comprehensive Account of Political, Financial, and Media Domination

Lebanon today is ensnared in a dark web far more pervasive and intense than the digital darknet—a complex, multilayered network of systemic paralysis permeating the political, economic, media, and social spheres. This shadowy web entangles every aspect of Lebanese life, locking the country in a state of stagnation where genuine progress remains agonizingly out of reach and the hope for meaningful change barely flickers on the horizon.A new hope emerged in early 2025 when Joseph Aoun (not related to Michel Aoun), former commander of the Lebanese Armed Forces, was elected president. He was widely seen as a unifying figure capable of breaking political deadlock.

Subsequently, Nawaf Salam was appointed prime minister, forming a relatively technocratic cabinet with a focus on reforms, including drafting a 2025 budget and amending banking secrecy laws to increase financial transparency.

Despite these promising signals, the entrenched political forces associated with the old trio maintained significant influence. Hezbollah kept control of key ministries, limiting reform scope, while Riyadh Mikati’s caretaker government slowed actions on reforms before the new cabinet.

The government approved some reforms such as the banking secrecy law amendment in April 2025, allowing audit and oversight of up to ten years of bank records, and efforts to support war-affected communities, but more profound structural reforms stalled.

The appointment of the central bank governor in March 2025 under industry lobbying, contrary to reformist preferences, symbolized resistance to meaningful banking sector changes.

The regional context shifted with the weakening of Hezbollah’s military capacity due to Israeli actions and Syria’s collapse, opening a narrow window for change. Still, internal political sectarianism and vested interests prevented decisively capitalizing on this shift.

May 2025 municipal elections marked the first since 2016, engaging some political discourse but illustrating the entrenched governance crisis and public distrust.

More Read

Is America Breaking the Global Economy what does this Means for World Economic Uncertainty?

Minority Rights, Defense Treaty, Disarmament: Guns, Leverage, and Loyalties: U.S. Military Aid to Lebanon and the Strategic Push to Sideline Hezbollah (3/3)

Self-Organized Voluntary Return Program with Incentives Drive Syrian Refugees Home

I. The Banking Crisis: Economic Strangulation at the Core

At the heart of Lebanon’s dark web lies an unprecedented financial collapse marked by catastrophic losses and debilitating restrictions:

• Lebanese banks face accumulated losses approaching $83 billion, exceeding the total country GDP of $55 billion (2019).
• Deposit liabilities in foreign currencies stand at around $94.31 billion, yet an estimated 77% of these depositor funds have been depleted, largely due to the central bank’s mismanagement and the depletion of foreign reserves.
• Strict capital controls and withdrawal limits remain in place. Most Lebanese depositors can withdraw no more than $500 per month, with recently opened accounts restricted further to $250 per month. Annual withdrawal ceilings vary but generally remain between $5,100 and $6,800.
• Lump-sum withdrawals are prohibited, effectively barring citizens from full access to their savings.
• The banking workforce has shrunk significantly due to layoffs and resignations—by over 10% since 2019—leading to operational strains.
• Bank assets at correspondent institutions reveal a negative net position, and while total deposits at the central bank nominally reach $86.6 billion, only approximately $9.74 billion remain liquid and accessible.
• The private sector credit pool has contracted considerably, down to about $9.75 billion, and government payments on Eurobonds have been suspended since 2020, risking sovereign default.
• Inflation rates remain high, though projected to moderate to about 15.2% in 2025, with real GDP growth forecasts pegged around 4.7%, albeit from a deeply depressed economic baseline, underscoring ongoing fiscal pressures and external shocks.

Government paralysis intensifies these problems by postponing critical banking reforms and restructuring steps needed to stabilize the sector, thereby sustaining depositor losses and eroding confidence within both Lebanon and international partners.

II. Political Paralysis and Armed Factions: The Governance Deadlock

This financial crisis unfolds amid a paralyzed political landscape dominated by sectarian cleavages and armed nonstate actors:

• The government refuses to disarm Hezbollah’s militia or address the status of Palestinian refugee camps, where armed factions operate with impunity. This stance reflects a deliberate unwillingness to dismantle such groups, weakening state sovereignty and perpetuating internal division.
• The Lebanese political class remains deeply fragmented and entrenched in sectarian power-sharing, relying on these factions as de facto power brokers.
• This impasse extends to economic governance, where key decisions concerning banking and economic reforms are continually deferred, signaling tacit complicity with financial elites and obstructing meaningful recovery.

III. Media Tyranny: The Political Familism Web Ensnaring Public Discourse

Compounding these crises is a rigid and opaque media structure dominated by political and familial interests, which functions as a pivotal node in Lebanon’s “dark web” of control:

• According to the 2024 Media Ownership Monitor (MOM) by the Samir Kassir Foundation and Reporters Without Borders, approximately 78.4% of Lebanese media outlets—across television, radio, print, and online platforms (29 out of 37 outlets monitored)—are owned or controlled by political parties, current or former members of parliament, government officials, or politically affiliated families.
• Media ownership is polarized and segmented by political affiliation, shaping public opinion through partisan lenses:
  • Hezbollah owns Al Manar TV and Al Nour radio, disseminating its narratives domestically and regionally.
  • The Lebanese Forces operate Radio Liban Libre and the website Lebanese-Forces.com, promoting Christian nationalist viewpoints.
  • The Phalange (Kataeb) Party controls Voix du Liban 100.3, a longstanding radio channel.
  • The Syrian Social Nationalist Party publishes Al Binaa newspaper.
  • The Free Patriotic Movement oversees Ayyar.org, an online news platform.
  • The Lebanese Communist Party runs Sawt El-Shaab radio station.
• Beyond political parties, dominant familial networks control multiple media platforms often simultaneously, exemplifying Lebanese “political familism.” Twelve powerful families — including the Hariris, Aouns, Mikatís, Khazens, Khayats, Murrs, and Pharaons — wield influence over approximately 43% of media outlets.
• For example, the four major TV stations commanding about 78.1% of the national audience are owned by key families:
  • LBCI by the Daher-Saad family,
  • Al Jadeed by the Khayat family,
  • MTV by the Murr family,
  • OTV by the Aoun family.
• Similarly, leading Arabic-language daily newspapers such as al-Joumhouria, an-Nahar, al-Akhbar, and ad-Diyar control nearly 78% of print readership and are linked to influential families and political factions.
• Lebanese media laws do not enforce full transparency or prevent conflicts of interest, allowing political actors and their kin to conceal ownership stakes. This leads to a lack of genuine media pluralism and an environment where editorial lines largely reflect partisan agendas.
• The net effect is a media environment fragmented along political and sectarian lines, fostering polarization, suppressing independent journalism, and hijacking public discourse to uphold elite interests.

IV. Interlocked Political-Banking Interests Reinforcing the Web

The banking sector itself constitutes a core pillar of Lebanon’s dark web, tightly intertwined with the political system:

• Numerous banks have direct or indirect stakeholders linked to political parties or influential families, reinforcing the oligarchic order.
• This intertwining ensures that economic policies favor political survival rather than economic reform or depositor protection, sustaining capital controls, sluggish restructuring, and operational opacity.
• Political stakeholders influence both bank governance and financial policy, blocking transparency and reforms that would disrupt their power or economic advantage.

V. The Vortex Entrapping Lebanese Society: Consequences for the Population

This dense intersection of political paralysis, financial mismanagement, and media manipulation leaves Lebanese society trapped in a vortex of despair:

• Citizens face severe restrictions accessing their life savings, with capital controls confining withdrawals to tiny monthly sums amidst a backdrop of hyperinflation and economic deprivation.
• Political disenfranchisement deepens, as the public perceives no feasible path to reform or redemption. Electoral participation wanes, and activism is met with increasing repression.
• Media narratives are controlled and partisan, with influential primetime TV programs hosted by figures like Marcel Ghanem and Georges of NTV often echoing the entrenched power structures, weakening public will and critical debate.
• Social despair escalates, with mounting depression reported among activists and ordinary citizens alike.

VI. Summary Table of Key Indicators

VII. Conclusion

Lebanon today is caught in an inescapable dark web that intricately weaves economic ruin, political inertia, and media domination into one suffocating grip, strangling the hopes and livelihoods of its people.

Without decisive, multifaceted reforms—encompassing fundamental banking sector restructuring, political sovereignty restoration via disarming militias, and comprehensive media ownership transparency and pluralism initiatives—the country’s spiral of decay will continue unabated, extending the shadow of despair over Lebanese society indefinitely.

Sources:

• Media Ownership Monitor Lebanon 2024, Samir Kassir Foundation & Reporters Without Borders
• Lebanon Banking Crisis Data and Reports, 2025
• Prior conversation data synthesized with additional contextual insights on Lebanese political economy