The political impasse in Lebanon as of 2025 is marked by deep-rooted sectarian divisions, with significant challenges stemming from both internal dynamics and external influences, particularly from Iran and its proxies. After over two years without a president or a fully functioning government, Lebanon saw a breakthrough with the election of General Joseph Aoun as president in January 2025 and the appointment of Nawaf Salam as prime minister. This new government ended a period of institutional paralysis and was formed amid immense pressures from sectarian parties, notably Hezbollah and the Amal Movement, which represent Lebanon’s powerful Shia community. While these parties retained some influence, they no longer hold a veto-level share of government positions as before, reflecting a subtle but important shift in political power dynamics.timep+2
The Shia community in Lebanon felt deeply targeted and vulnerable following the recent devastating war and the killing of top Hezbollah leaders. Key events fueling this sentiment include the September 27, 2024, Israeli airstrike on Hezbollah’s central headquarters in the Dahieh suburb of Beirut, which killed the group’s longtime leader Hassan Nasrallah along with several senior commanders and Iranian Quds Force officials. This strike demolished underground Hezbollah facilities but also caused widespread destruction in densely populated Shia neighborhoods, killing civilians and displacing thousands.
This attack was part of a broader, intense Israeli campaign against Hezbollah that killed over 700 people in Lebanon, injured thousands, and devastated southern Lebanon, the heartland of the Shia community and Hezbollah’s stronghold. The loss of leadership, including the death of Nasrallah and subsequent assassinations of other key commanders, dealt a severe blow to Hezbollah’s military capabilities and morale.
For the Shia population, Hezbollah symbolizes not only political representation but also protection and community services. The widespread destruction of their neighborhoods and the loss of revered leaders intensified feelings of collective victimization and fear of marginalization amid rising hostilities. A recent poll published by Fikra Forum shows that among Lebanon’s Shia population today, 75% of respondents say they hold a “very positive” attitude toward Hezbollah—which is down only slightly from 83% in late 2017 and 77% in late 2018.
Although numbers do not lie, they can mask shifting realities on the ground that are difficult to capture in polling data. Unpacking the layers of Shia identity requires much more than blunt questions from outsiders about their opinion on Hezbollah and Iran. Identifying the real attitudes of Shia involves understanding these layers and looking into issues beyond Hezbollah and Iran, such as war and peace in Lebanon, Hezbollah’s domestic allies, and the significance of the Shia center of Najaf in Iraq—where Ayatollah Sistani presents a notable challenge to the Iranian model of Shia community through wilayet e-faqih.
The advent of the Barrack paper, which calls for Hezbollah’s disarmament and comprehensive state control over arms, further exacerbated the community’s sense of being targeted. The paper was perceived by many Shia as an external imposition threatening their security and political influence. Coming on the heels of military defeats and assassinations, the demands for disarmament felt like additional pressure aimed specifically at weakening the Shia presence and Hezbollah’s role.
In this context, the Shia community’s upset is rooted in trauma from war losses, the killing of their leaders, and fears that the Barrack paper could translate into political and security marginalization. The combination of military strikes and political demands created a perception of existential threat, reinforcing their resolve to resist changes perceived as diminishing their role in Lebanon’s fragile sectarian balance.
However, Lebanon remains heavily destabilized by its recent wars, economic collapse, and the ongoing threats along its southern borders. Hezbollah, backed by Iran, continues to wield military and political power and has been under intense scrutiny and pressure to disarm. The Lebanese government officially announced plans to disarm all armed groups, including Hezbollah, but the group has rejected such calls, maintaining its armed status as a key political and military actor, especially amid renewed Israeli strikes and hostilities.aljazeera+2
The “Barrack paper” refers to a U.S.-backed proposal aiming to address Lebanon’s long-standing issue of disarmament of Hezbollah and the restoration of full state sovereignty over weapons in the country. The paper calls for a definitive timeline and mechanisms to disarm all armed militias, primarily Hezbollah, which represents Lebanon’s Shia community in political and military terms.
The Shia community, through Hezbollah and its ally the Amal Movement, was upset and strongly opposed to the Barrack paper mainly due to concerns over the timing, perceived external imposition, and the consequences it could have on Lebanon’s internal balance and regional standing. While they do not fundamentally oppose the principle of exclusive state control over arms, their objection centers on how the plan is implemented. They view the paper as serving primarily Israeli and Western interests, particularly at a sensitive period when Israel continues to attack Lebanon’s southern borders. Hezbollah and Amal leaders argued that the paper was rushed and not properly discussed within Lebanon’s delicate political framework, which demands consensus among Lebanon’s divided sectarian groups.
The refusal of Shia ministers associated with Hezbollah and Amal to fully endorse or participate in government sessions discussing the paper led to protests within Shia-populated areas such as Beirut, the Bekaa Valley, and South Lebanon. These protests reflected a broad feeling of being targeted and marginalized by both domestic opponents and foreign powers.
The deeper roots of this upset lie in the Shia community’s historical grievances: marginalization in political representation, economic neglect, and the precarious security environment created by the dual presence of Hezbollah’s armed strength alongside the Lebanese state’s sovereignty ambitions. For many in the Shia community, Hezbollah is not only a political party but a provider of social services and security, which complicates calls for disarmament.
In summary, the Barrack paper triggered backlash among the Shia because it was seen as an externally imposed roadmap demanding disarmament in a way that threatens their political and security interests without adequately addressing Hezbollah’s role as a defender against Israeli aggression or providing guarantees protecting the Shia community’s socio-political status in Lebanon. The community’s upset is rooted in both immediate political dynamics and long-standing sectarian, security, and regional alignments, notably Iran’s backing of Hezbollah. This tension reflects the broader struggle in Lebanon between state sovereignty and the entrenched power of militias tied to sectarian identities and regional conflicts.
The Shia community in Lebanon faces a precarious future. As the largest sect in the country, Shia groups have historically been marginalized but have risen politically through Hezbollah and Amal. They bear the brunt of conflict-related devastation, demographic shifts, and political tensions. Their political role is crucial yet fraught, as they navigate pressures from both within Lebanon and from external state actors like Iran, which exerts influence through Hezbollah. The Shia community’s political fortunes are central to Lebanon’s overall stability and are considered pivotal in any national reconciliation or reform processes.worldcrunch+2 Amid pressures for disarmament and political reform within Lebanon, the Shia community faces a delicate balance: maintaining its political and military influence while confronting calls for integration into a unified state security apparatus. The ongoing regional tensions fuel uncertainty about Hezbollah’s armed status and the community’s security.
Iraq’s supportive role towards Lebanon and the Shia groups, facilitated by shared sectarian ties and political interests, provides a strategic regional alliance that may bolster the community’s political resilience and economic prospects. This regional connection could be instrumental in navigating diplomatic pressures and fostering cooperation.
Ultimately, the Shia community’s future will hinge on how regional power dynamics evolve, the ability of Lebanese political structures to accommodate their influence peacefully, and the extent to which regional hostilities impact Lebanon’s internal cohesion and security environment. While the community remains strong, it faces significant challenges that will shape its role and fate in the years ahead.
The connection between Lebanon and Iraq further complicates the regional landscape. Iraq has reaffirmed its support for Lebanon amid its political and security crises, emphasizing solidarity against Israeli aggression and promoting bilateral cooperation in various sectors including energy and reconstruction. Iraq, maintaining ties with both Iran and Western countries, positions itself as a regional stabilizer and seeks to deepen diplomatic and economic links with Lebanon. These relations are strategically vital for Lebanon’s stability and economic recovery, given the shared sectarian affiliations and mutual regional security interests.themedialine+2
In sum, Lebanon’s ongoing political deadlock is intricately tied to the role of its Shia political factions, the influence of Iran, and the broader regional dynamics including Iraqi support. The Shia community’s future remains uncertain but critical to the country’s path forward. Hostilities linked to Iran-backed groups persist, complicating hopes for disarmament and political normalization, while Iraq’s engagement offers a hopeful but challenging avenue for economic and political cooperation in a volatile Middle East.
